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Abstract
Background: Marburg virus (MARV), a zoonotic pathogen causing severe hemorrhagic fever in man, has emerged in Angola
resulting in the largest outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) with the highest case fatality rate to date.
Methodology/Principal Findings: A mobile laboratory unit (MLU) was deployed as part of the World Health Organization
outbreak response. Utilizing quantitative real-time PCR assays, this laboratory provided specific MARV diagnostics in Uige,
the epicentre of the outbreak. The MLU operated over a period of 88 days and tested 620 specimens from 388 individuals.
Specimens included mainly oral swabs and EDTA blood. Following establishing on site, the MLU operation allowed a
diagnostic response in ,4 hours from sample receiving. Most cases were found among females in the child-bearing age
and in children less than five years of age. The outbreak had a high number of paediatric cases and breastfeeding may have
been a factor in MARV transmission as indicated by the epidemiology and MARV positive breast milk specimens. Oral swabs
were a useful alternative specimen source to whole blood/serum allowing testing of patients in circumstances of resistance
to invasive procedures but limited diagnostic testing to molecular approaches. There was a high concordance in test results
between the MLU and the reference laboratory in Luanda operated by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Conclusions/Significance: The MLU was an important outbreak response asset providing support in patient management
and epidemiological surveillance. Field laboratory capacity should be expanded and made an essential part of any future
outbreak investigation.
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Introduction
Marburg virus (MARV) is classified as members of the family
Filoviridae, genus Marburgvirus, type species Lake Victoria marburgvirus.
A single species has been described which includes several virus
strains [1]. Today, the geographic distribution of MARV seems to
primarily involve areas in East Africa within 500 miles of Lake
Victoria, Zimbabwe, but also western Africa [2,3]. MARV is of
zoonotic nature with an as yet unidentified reservoir in nature, but
with strong cumulative evidence that bats are involved in the
zoonotic cycle [4,5] as this has also been implicated for Ebola virus
[6].
MARV is the causative agent of Marburg hemorrhagic fever
(MHF), a disease that was first described in 1967 among
laboratory workers in Germany and former Yugoslavia [7–9].
Until 1998, only sporadic MHF cases have occurred in
Zimbabwe/South Africa (1975) and in Kenya (1980 & 1987)
[10–12]. The first community-based MHF outbreak was reported
in 1998–2000 from the Watsa/Durba region in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) [13,14]. In 2004/2005 MARV first
appeared in western Africa, Angola, causing to date the largest
MHF outbreak on record [15,16]. The latest MHF episodes
involved 4 reported cases from western Uganda associated with a
single mine (2007) [5], and two imported cases into the US and the
www.plosntds.org 1 May 2011 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e1183Netherlands, who independently visited the same cave in Uganda
(2008) [17,18] (Table 1). In addition, three laboratory exposures,
one of them fatal, have been reported [9,19,20].
In March 2005, the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML)
of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) offered assistance
to the World Health Organization (WHO) as a partner of the
‘Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network’ (GOARN) (http://
www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/) for the MHF outbreak
in Angola. Under GOARN, a Mobile Laboratory Unit (MLU) was
deployed to Uige, the epicentre of the outbreak, to assist in clinical
management and epidemiological surveillance with MARV-
specific and limited differential diagnostic capacity. Here we
discuss the usefulness of this latest response capacity for the
management of viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks.
Methods
Laboratory operation
Laboratory space was made available for the MLU in the
Paediatric Ward of the Uige Provincial Hospital (Figure 1). Four
rooms were used for the laboratory set up to ensure isolation of
infectious work from other activities and to separate PCR assay
steps to minimize contamination. Two rooms were located on one
side of a central hallway; the smaller of the two rooms was
accessible by a single door and had no windows or other opening
and was utilized for infectious work (‘hot room’). The anteroom to
this room was used for the preparation for entry to the infectious
room and the subsequent disinfection of the worker following
infectious work. Opposite these rooms were two additional rooms;
one was used for RNA extraction and running the Q-RT-PCR
and the other room was utilized as a ‘clean room’ for master mix
preparation. Reagents and the laboratory team (2–3 members)
were replaced every three weeks; in total NML deployed six teams
to Angola to cover the period of April 1 to June 27, 2005.
Sample collection
Clinical samples were collected by personnel wearing personal
protective equipment (PPE) including a surgical mask, cap, shield
or goggles, gown, apron, gloves (two pairs) and boots. Swab
samples (nasal and oral) were collected using cotton tipped
applicators (AMG Medical, VWR, Mississauga, ON, Canada).
Applicator tips were stored in 700 ml of Dulbecco’s modified
essential medium (DMEM) or phosphate buffered saline (PBS)
supplemented with 5% bovine serum albumin (Invitrogen,
Burlington, ON, Canada). Whole blood and serum samples were
collected using EDTA and serum vacutainer tubes, respectively.
For transport, tubes were sealed in plastic bags, surface disinfected
with a 1% hypochlorite solution, sealed into a second bag or
container and again surface disinfected. Collection of human
Table 1. Documented outbreaks/episodes/cases of Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever (MHF).
Location Year Strain
Cases
(Deaths) Epidemiology
Germany/Yugoslavia [7–9] 1967 Ratayczak /
Popp
32 (7) Imported monkeys from Uganda source of primary
human infections
Zimbabwe [10] 1975 Ozolin 3 (1) Unknown origin; index case was infected in
Zimbabwe (lethal), secondary cases in South Africa
Kenya [11] 1980 Musoke 2 (1) Unknown origin; lethal index case was infected in
western Kenya
Kenya [12] 1987 Ravn 1 (1) Unknown origin; expatriate traveling in western
Kenya
Democratic Republic of the Congo [13,14] 1998–2000 Multiple
lineages
154 (128) Infections related to mining; multiple virus lineages;
short transmission chains in families
Angola [15,16] 2004/
2005
Angola 252 (227) Unknown origin; cases linked to Uige hospital and
included high number of paediatric cases
Uganda [5] 2007 Multiple lineages 4 (1) Infections related to visits of a mine (Kitaka Cave)
United States [17] 2008 n.d. 1 (0) Unknown origin; infection related to visit of cave in
western Uganda
The Netherlands [18] 2008 n.d. 1 (1) Unknown origin; infection related to visit of cave in
western Uganda
[7–18] = numbers in reference list; n.d. = not defined. To date, a total approximately 450 cases of MHF have been officially reported with case fatality rates in outbreaks
ranging from ,22–90%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.t001
Author Summary
A mobile laboratory unit (MLU) was deployed to Uige,
Angola as part of the World Health Organization response
to an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever caused by
Marburg virus (MARV). Utilizing mainly quantitative real-
time PCR assays, this laboratory provided specific MARV
diagnostics in the field. The MLU operated for 88
consecutive days allowing MARV-specific diagnostic re-
sponse in ,4 hours from sample receiving. Most cases
were found among females in the child-bearing age and in
children less than five years of age including a high
number of paediatric cases implicating breastfeeding as
potential transmission route. Oral swabs were identified as
a useful alternative specimen source to the standard whole
blood/serum specimens for patients refusing blood draw.
There was a high concordance in test results between the
MLU and the reference laboratory in Luanda operated by
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The
MLU was an important outbreak response asset providing
valuable support in patient management and epidemio-
logical surveillance. Field laboratory capacity should be
expanded and made an essential part of any future
outbreak investigation.
Mobile Laboratory Unit for On-Site Diagnostics
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approved by the local Scientific and Technical Coordination
Committee in Uige, Angola.
Sample handling and RNA extraction
Infectious specimens were manipulated in the field laboratory
by personnel wearing Tyvek suits and HEPA filter-equipped
powered air purifying respirators, in a room isolated and dedicated
for this work (Figure 1). An aliquot (140 ml) was removed from
each sample and inactivated by adding 560 ml of the guanidine
thiocyanate lysis buffer AVL. The sample tubes were submerged
in 1% hypochlorite solution for 10 minutes and released from the
infectious area. All further work was performed with PPE as
outlined above. For RNA isolation we used the QIAamp Viral
RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Mississauga, ON, Canada). All waste
material was treated with 1% hypochlorite solution and inciner-
ated on the same day. Two separate sample aliquots were
prepared for transportation to the reference laboratory in Luanda
operated by the Special Pathogens Branch of the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (US-CDC). Remaining samples
were forwarded to the National Institute for Communicable
Diseases (NCID), Sandringham, South Africa, and finally shipped
to the US-CDC (Atlanta) or NML (Winnipeg) for further testing.
Transportation was carried out in compliance with International
Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations after prior approval
by the appropriate national authorities of the sending or receiving
countries.
RT-PCR diagnostic assays
Initially, two quantitative real-time PCR (Q-RT-PCR) assays
were used that targeted regions of the polymerase (L) [MARVLF-
TTATTGCATCAGGCTTCTTGGCA, MARVLR–GGTAT-
TAAAAAATGCATCCAA (AY358025; bp.13321–133517)] and
the glycoprotein (GP) genes [MARVGPF–AAAGTTGCTGA-
TTCCCCTTTGGA, MARVGPR–GCATGAGGGTTTTGA-
CCTTGAAT (AY358025; bp.6131–6355)]. Later, an assay that
targeted the nucleoprotein (NP) gene [MARVNPF–TGAATT-
TATCAGGGATTAAC, MARVNPR–GTTCATGTCGCCT-
TTGTAG (AY358025; bp.967–1146)] was used in place of the
GP assay. The switch to an NP target was the result of testing that
indicated this target was potentially more sensitive and provided a
more distinct melting curve which simplified interpretation.
MARV RNA was detected using the Lightcycler RNA Amplifi-
cation SYBR Green I kit (Roche, Laval, PQ). Briefly, 5 ml of RNA
was added to 20 ml of master mix containing 1X SYBR Green I
mix, 5 mM MgCl2, 0.6 mM forward and reverse primers and
0.5 ml of the enzyme mix. Q-RT-PCR assays were run on
Smartcycler thermocyclers (Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA). A reverse
transcriptase step at 50uC for 20 minutes and a 2 minute
inactivation step at 94uC were followed by 40 cycles at 94uC for 15
seconds, 50uC for 30 seconds and 72uC for 30 seconds where a
single acquisition point was taken. Melt curve analysis was
performed to confirm the identity of amplification products.
Samples were considered positive if they produced melting point
confirmed amplification products in two assays. Amplification
products were later confirmed by sequencing at NML (Winnipeg).
Results
The algorithm for the laboratory testing and the rational for
positive/negative test results are presented in Figure 2. Overall,
the MLU tested 620 clinical specimens from 388 patients/
individuals over an operation period of 88 days. The clinical
specimens included mainly oral swabs and EDTA blood/serum
samples; the remainder consisted of nasal and conjunctival swabs
and breast milk. The sample source and test results of individuals
tested are presented in Table 2.
The daily case load of the MLU fluctuated, with the number of
individuals analyzed per day varying between 0 and 14 (Figure 3).
This analysis often included multiple samples per individual on a
single day and serial surveillance sampling of suspect and
confirmed cases. The age and sex distribution of individuals
tested were slightly shifted towards females (68%) and the younger
Figure 1. Laboratory set up and procedures. Laboratory space was made available to us in the Paediatric Ward of the Uige Provincial Hospital.
Four rooms were used for the laboratory set up to ensure isolation of infectious work from other activities and to separate PCR assay steps to
minimize contamination. (A) Room for RT-PCR master mix preparation; (B) room for sample inactivation; (C) room for RNA extraction and real-time RT-
PCR; (D) room for PPE donning and disinfection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.g001
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the largest single age group at 21%). The distribution of positive
cases clearly demonstrated a larger proportion of females and
children among the infected individuals (Figure 4).
A comparison of detection of MARV from oral swabs and
EDTA blood was performed on 63 individuals from whom both
specimen types were available from the same day. Both samples
sources yielded identical test results in 98.5% of the individuals
with roughly 33% positive and 66% negative for MARV. Cycle
threshold (Ct) values for most paired samples did not differ
markedly indicating similar viral loads in both specimen sources
(Figure 5). Testing on some patients did provide disparate results
for blood and swab samples but test results were identical even in
these instances. Similarly, for 12 individuals, both oral and nasal
swabs specimens were collected which resulted in identical test
results and no significant differences in Ct values for the positives.
Additionally, 3 breast milk specimens from laboratory-confirmed
female MHF cases were analyzed and shown to be positive for
MARV (data not shown).
We did not experience any evidence for PCR contamination
during the entire operation. All controls produced the expected
positive and negative results. Nevertheless, all samples tested in Uige
were subsequently shipped to Luanda for confirmation at a US-CDC
established biosafety level 3 (BSL3) laboratory using a real-time PCR
hybridization assay targeting the matrix protein (VP40) gene, an
antigen capture enzyme-linked immunorsorbent (ELISA) assay and
antibody (IgM and IgG) detection ELISAs [16]. Overall, the
reference laboratory confirmed test results of the MLU in 97.5% of
all specimens analyzed and in all but one case. The high concordance
between field and reference laboratory results supported the on-site
report of the MLU results to the ward and the surveillance teams,
allowing a turn-around time of ,4 hours from sample receiving to
laboratory diagnosis. After closing the MLU, further clinical
specimens were shipped to Winnipeg for diagnosis via Luanda
(US-CDC)andSandringham(NCID).Eventually,allspecimenswere
shipped to the BSL4 laboratories in Atlanta and/or Winnipeg for
additional analysis.Sequence analysis of allamplified products and of
several virus isolates obtained at the US-CDC [16] and NML
(authors, unpublished data) demonstrated a high degree of
conservation indicating a single or very few introductions into the
community, with subsequent human-to-human transmission.
Differential diagnostic testing was only performed for malaria
(Plasmodium spp.) using a real time PCR assay targeting the ssuRNA
gene [21]. Test results for 19 individuals demonstrated two groups of
Figure 2. Diagnostic algorithm. Key: pos = positive; neg = negative.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.g002
Table 2. MLU Sample source and test results.
Case sample source Total persons tested
Persons positive/
negative
Blood samples only 52 7/45
Blood and swab samples 116 28/88
Swab samples only 220 95/125
Total 388 130 (258)
Field lab processed 620 patient samples from 388 individuals during the 88 day
operation of the lab. For the majority of cases only swab samples were
available.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.t002
Mobile Laboratory Unit for On-Site Diagnostics
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individuals (Ct values ,20), based on parasitemia levels (data not
shown). The value of this diagnostic tool needs to be further evaluated.
Discussion
Under current filoviral hemorrhagic fever outbreak operation
protocols several activities are undertaken where accurate and
rapid diagnostic testing can have significant impact:
(A) Suspected patients are to be admitted to the isolation ward
and managed by watching clinical progression and
response; discharging those who responded quickly to
empiric treatment, and following the rest until they recover
or succumb to disease.
(B) Contact tracing of suspected cases requiring daily monitor-
ing of family members and close contacts by field teams
dedicated to this essential outbreak control function.
(C) Unexplained deaths are routinely treated as possible cases
and bodies are buried safely to limit further spread but
denying the family their customary burial practices.
(D) Those fortunate to recover can be shunned by their family,
if any remain, or the community at large due to the fear
they can act as a new source of infection.
To obtain diagnostic testing, specimens have normally been
shipped to an international reference laboratory such as the
Institut de recherche pour le de ´veloppement (IRD), Franceville,
Gabon; NCID in Sandringham, South Africa; or the US-CDC in
Atlanta, United States resulting in a significant delay (days to
weeks due to shipment issues) in laboratory diagnosis with limited
or no benefit for acute case patient or outbreak management [22–
24]. Therefore, such operation protocols require a fairly large
infrastructure, longer hospitalization periods, and more staff and
consequently increase resources and exposure risks. An MLU,
providing testing results in a 4 hour turn around, can be an
integral part of the outbreak response and simplify lessen many of
the efforts needed to quickly contain and control the outbreak.
Laboratory testing of a symptomatic individuals during triage
will allow the team to quickly assess if the person is a case or not.
Confirmed cases can be appropriately isolated and supportive care
initiated. Symptomatic individuals with negative test results can be
Figure 3. Field MARV diagnostic lab at Uige, Angola 2005; daily case load and positive sample detection. The height of each bar
represents the total daily case load for the lab with the positive cases indicated by the solid portion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.g003
Figure 4. Age and gender distribution of positive cases. Positive cases identified during the operation of the field lab are shown separated by
age and gender (female & and male %). The distribution of positive cases demonstrates a higher proportion of females (68%) and children, 0 to 5
years, (21%) among the infected individuals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.g004
Mobile Laboratory Unit for On-Site Diagnostics
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another ward or kept in an observation ward for follow up testing
or discharging. In Uige, and to a lesser extent also at previous
outbreak locations, the isolation ward was largely unacceptable to
the local population and significant resistance was present to have
family members admitted [15,25]. However a positive test result
for MARV was normally sufficient to convince people of the
necessity for admission to the ward. Isolating only those individuals
who require it will reduce the infrastructure needed for isolation,
minimize the hospitalization time for non-cases, reduce the
number of staff and consequently reduce the risk of exposure for
both staff and non-cases.
Cases that can be confirmed or excluded by laboratory testing
can significantly contribute to one of the most important outbreak
control measures, contact tracing. The current protocols call for
the follow-up of contacts of suspected cases for 21 consecutive
days. The presence of a field laboratory can help to arrive at a
rapid confirmed final diagnosis for each suspected case, thereby
decreasing the burden of field teams who may frequently be
conducting contract tracing of cases with uncertain diagnosis.
Testing in this outbreak found that oral swabs from severely ill
or deceased patients were a suitable sample for MARV testing by
Q-RT-PCR. This allowed the MLU to safely test samples from
corpses of unknown cause and when possible, to release MARV-
negative bodies to the family members for traditional and religious
burial procedures, a sensitive issue with almost all local
communities in endemic areas. The value of swabs from corpses
for diagnostic purposes needs to be further evaluated in future
outbreaks and perhaps confirmed by other technologies such as
immunohistochemistry [26]. Post mortem RNA degradation
might render a test falsely negative even so infectious Ebola virus
has been detected in blood samples more than a month after blood
draw and storage at room temperature [27]. Any test results
should take clinical presentation and epidemiology into account.
A growing concern is the return of negative and convalescent
patients to the community, which may increase with the
implementation of more advanced case patient care and the
perspective of treatment options in the future [2,24,28]. These
people are often shunned by their families and neighbours and a
timely negative test result as provided through the MLU may aid in
their re-acceptance and safe re-introduction into the community.
In Angola, field diagnostic support was used for the first time in
response to a MHF outbreak. Also the first time, the combined
operation of a field and reference laboratory allowed for a unique
evaluation of field diagnostic capacity under difficult circumstanc-
es and proved it to be accurate, efficient and safe in operation.
There have been previous attempts to provide field laboratory
diagnostics for outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic fever. In 1976
during the Zaire ebolavirus outbreak an immunofluorescence assay
was used for acute case identification but the results were
considered poor [29]. In 2000 during the Ebola outbreak (Sudan
ebolavirus) the US-CDC operated a laboratory within the Gulu
district at St. Mary’s Lacor Hospital, Uganda, and used antigen
capture and reverse transcription nested PCR (RT-PCR) to
successfully diagnose infection in suspected patients [30]. In 2003
during the Ebola outbreak (Zaire ebolavirus) in Mbomo, The
Republic of the Congo, NML together with partners from the
IRD, Franceville, Gabon, and the Bundeswehr Institute of
Microbiology, Munich, Germany, operated a small field labora-
tory under the lead of WHO using antigen capture and Q-RT-
PCR to diagnose acute cases [31,32].
In general, the usefulness of on-site laboratory support during
filovirus outbreaks is not really questioned [2,24], and, in
particular, the positive experience from this MHF outbreak
demonstrate that rapid turn-around RT-PCR diagnostics can
clearly aid in surveillance and case management [15,25]. PCR-
based techniques can be prone to contamination resulting in false
positive results. Here we used a technique that did not require
opening of tubes largely reducing the risk of contamination. Other
concerns have been raised towards the reliability of RT-PCR
assays during early disease stages and for survivors in the early
convalescent stage, the consequences of false-positive and false-
negative results of RT-PCR assays could be dire to outbreak
management [30]. Indeed, PCR-based assays, like other diagnostic
tests, have weaknesses and do not produce reliable results under all
circumstances. Therefore, independent, methodologically differ-
ent, confirmatory assay such as antigen capture to support RT-
PCR should be mandatory. However, nowadays most laboratories
depend on PCR detection as their first and most rapid diagnostic
methods and there are good reasons to support that choice [33]. If
a confirmatory assay is not available or unsuccessful, alternatives
for RT-PCR confirmation include sample re-extraction, a second
clinical specimen and/or an assay with independent targets
(Figure 2). Nevertheless, any diagnostics should not replace
general and common sense precautions in case patient manage-
ment and on-site laboratory diagnostics should be in close
Figure 5. Cycle threshold values for paired blood and swab samples. Cases where whole blood (&) and swab (%) samples were available
for testing the same day are shown. Viral loads from both sample sources were comparable and do not consistently indicate one sample source as
more suitable for viral load determination.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001183.g005
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physicians/nurses and laboratory personnel [15,25]. Importantly,
during this field laboratory deployment, Q-RT-PCR proved to be
very sensitive and reliable even in this challenging environment.
Patient samples were positive in our testing beginning on the day
of onset of symptoms but we did see that detection in swab samples
could be delayed by a few hours when compared to blood this
early in the course of illness.
The collection of appropriate clinical specimens for diagnostic
testing has become an increasing problem during filovirus
outbreaks. The reasons for this can include the lack of properly
trained personnel, fear of personnel to apply invasive procedures,
cultural objections to bleeding and any other invasive pre- and
post mortem sampling procedure, and insufficient infrastructure
for sampling and transportation [22,24,34]. In that respect, the
MHF outbreak in Angola was not different from previous
outbreaks. In particular, resistance in the community to bleeding
and post mortem invasive procedures, such as cardiac puncture or
liver biopsy, and the increasing resistance of aid personnel to apply
invasive procedures in the field (community) made oral swabs the
predominant clinical specimen available for testing. As demon-
strated here on paired blood/oral swab samples, in general there
was no significant difference in viral load between oral swabs and
EDTA blood taken at the same time (Figure 5). This supported
oral swabs as an alternative diagnostic specimen to blood. The few
incidences when oral swabs were less suitable than EDTA blood
related to early disease stage and early convalescent stage samples.
Lower viral loads in oral swabs compared to EDTA blood, at these
stages, are likely to explain this discrepancy. Additionally, there
are inherent sampling variables associated with oral swabs (the
technique and efficiency of swabbing; moisture level of the oral
cavity) that are not present in a blood draw, which may also have a
role in these differences. However, despite the fact that oral swabs
seemed to have been an appropriate specimen source for
laboratory testing during this outbreak, and oral/nasal swabs are
valuable alternatives in cases of resistance in the affected
population to invasive procedures, EDTA blood should remain
the priority choice for a clinical specimen due to the longer period
of detectable viremia, the suitability to serological-based testing,
and the value for monitoring potential point of care therapies in
future.
While this study is not a detailed epidemiologic study, brief
mention of some of the data is warranted as it has not been yet
published elsewhere. This MHF outbreak was unique in regards to
its location, case number and case fatalities, but also showed a
large proportion of paediatric cases and cases among woman in
the child bearing ages [2,24]. Since MARV, as Ebola virus, are
usually transmitted through close contact with blood, secretions or
excretions from infected patients, family members and medical
personnel caring for patients or preparing bodies for burials are
considered high risk exposure groups [2,34]. It has been proposed
that because women provide the majority of in-home care that this
was the reason for the preponderance of cases in women [35].
Certainly women provide the majority of care for the children and
since, especially early in the outbreak, children less than 5 years of
age represented the largest single age group affected may also be
reflective of this fact. Furthermore, the detection of MARV in
breast milk during this outbreak indicates that breastfeeding might
have played a role in virus transmission. This is supported by
epidemiological data indicating transmission from infected moth-
ers to their nursing babies followed, after death of the mothers, by
virus transmission from the infected babies to wet nurses who
subsequently infected their own nursing child (authors, unpub-
lished observation). Other factors may have come into play
including the alleged lack of appropriate infection control within
the paediatric ward prior to the identification of the outbreak [36].
It is very unlikely that the predilection of women and young
children represents a biological predisposition, given that the
demographics of the outbreak changed through the course of the
outbreak (i.e. early in the outbreak a very high percentage were
paediatric cases whereas later cases became more evenly
distributed by age), and yet the virus changed very little [16].
Without more detailed epidemiologic data, it remains unclear
which of these transmission routes constituted significant mecha-
nisms for virus spread in the Uige outbreak.
Offering differential diagnosis significantly increases the value of
on-site diagnostics. This is much harder to achieve in the field and
requires variable clinical specimen (in particular blood or stool),
more manpower and more extensive and continuous supplies. At a
minimum, malaria diagnostics (e.g. commercially available rapid
dipstick tests) and diagnosis for severe gastrointestinal infections
should be available. Proper case patient management including
intravenous fluid administration would also require blood
chemistry and haematology analysis, another capacity that needs
to be considered for expansion of a field laboratory response
capacity.
Most of what constitutes the MLU can be sourced from
equipment that most reference laboratories would have access to
from their normal compliment of equipment and supplies,
however a dedicated MLU would likely require the investment
of approximately $100 000 and a weekly deployment cost of $2000
for reagents and supplies. Logistic needs and costs during a mission
can be best managed through a close working relationship with
other organizations including the WHO and Me ´decins Sans
Frontie `res (MSF). The greatest challenge to the operation of the
MLU was the lack of consistent electrical power and our reliance
on portable generators. This necessitated the use of battery backup
systems for thermocyclers and did not allow for storage of samples
or reagents at freezing temperatures as freeze-thaw cycles could
not be avoided. Fortunately, all reagents were relatively stable at
4 ˚C over a three week rotation period before replacement teams
replenished the reagents. We were able to efficiently operate the
MLU using teams of two members as the workload and workflow
rarely justified additional staff. We have since recommended that
teams of three be deployed to allow for rest and health issues.
In conclusion, the combined operation of a field and reference
laboratory in this outbreak allowed for a unique evaluation of field
diagnostic capacity under difficult circumstances. Rapid MARV-
specific Q-RT-PCR was useful for triage and assessing the need
for isolation. The quick turn-around of laboratory diagnosis on the
basis of Q-RT-PCR assays significantly improved outbreak
response efforts. Therefore we propose: ‘‘On-site laboratory diagnosis
should become a routine part of any future filovirus outbreak response as it
provides all responders with valuable information to help minimize the extent
and durations of these events’’.
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